

30 December 1974

Note for the DDI

SUBJECT: Murphy Commission Study on US Policy
Toward India and Pakistan

1. The attached tome is the product of the studies done by and under Professors Rudolph for the Murphy Commission. Rudolph sent me a copy, stating that "comments are most welcome". I do not propose to make any.

2. The present document consists of an 81-page study by the Rudolphs themselves, done in the finest style of political science, plus a series of separate, more factual, studies by other academics. A short section on "intelligence" begins on p. 18 of the Rudolphs' own paper. More or less incidental references to intelligence matters appear in the section on "coordination as centralization", p. 30ff., including quotations that are claimed to be statements made by Mr. Helms in WSAG meetings. We did not furnish any material of this kind; I assume it comes from NSC files.

3. The Rudolphs' paper is basically an attack on Kissinger, his outlook, which is described as "global parochialism", and the way he does business. [redacted] tells me it has raised hackles at State, and I can see why. I do not see any "problems" for us here, however.

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4. The Agency so far has also had contact of some kind with three of the authors of the individual studies included in the Rudolphs' document. They are Messrs. Stephen P. Cohen, Philip Oldenberg, and Robert Rich. Their contributions are marked with a check in the table of contents.

5. I am also attaching some informal comment from [redacted]. As he notes, we would like to have the "big red book" back, if possible.

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[redacted]
Bill Parmenter
DDOCI

Attachments: a/s

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Some Thoughts on "The Coordination of Complexity in South Asia."

1. I've glanced through the first 181 pages of this document and found them rather interesting. The "studies," beginning on page 82, were more factual than the report at the beginning of the book by the Rudolphs and, consequently, made for more exciting reading. Almost made me nostalgic for the excitement of 1971 in SOA. The Rudolphs, in turn, took me back far beyond 1971 -- to about 1947 and Pol Sci 201. You might try this on your zither: "The difficulties that arise from synchronic and from diachronic time are better managed if cosmological pluralism as a world view and insulation and decentralization as forms of organizational structure and relationships are preferred to cosmological monism and centralization." -- p. 22.

2. The reports that I read are aimed primarily at reviewing and analyzing foreign policy planning toward South Asia as it existed in 1971 and recommending changes in those procedures. State and DOD are treated in considerable detail but, appropriately, CIA is given peripheral treatment.

3. I found no serious factual errors as regards CIA or the intelligence community. I am puzzled by Rudolph's statement on page 32 that Helms, at a WSAG meeting on 4 December, referred to "four small" airfields when discussing the targets of the Pak air attack the ~~preceding day~~ preceding day. Our Sitrep of quoted, without dispute, Mrs. Gandhi's charge that eight airfields had been attacked. (I no longer have the draft briefing for the WSAG meeting for the 4th.)

I would also dispute Rudolph's statement on the same page that "After the fact, CIA analysts wondered whether Pakistan escalated hostilities from the local to the international level to save a deteriorating situation by bringing in third powers or to win a decisive military victory from which to bargain." We concluded from the beginning of the attack that it was designed to bring other powers or the UN into the act. In a special report for Kissinger, dated 6 December, SOA branch examined in detail the start of the war and concluded that Pakistan escalated hostilities on that date, not in an attempt to gain a quick victory, but in order to force the issue before the UN.

Finally, Oldenburg, on pages 170-172, writes of "weathervaning" -- slanting analysis to meet the preferences of the top leaders. I can't speak for DIA or INR, but as far as OCI is concerned, we never slanted our reports in 1971 to conform with what we knew to be the biases at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

All of the above is of little import, of course, but I include it to keep the record straight.

4. This report is of sufficient interest that I would hope that the SOA branch might eventually receive a copy for retention.

Chief/SOA Branch/MEA/OCI